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It is expected that by the year 2050 Europeans (EU-15) will live about five years longer than today. Given that today's remaining life-expectancy at 65 is almost 16 years for men and 20 years for women, an increase of 5 years will raise the cost of providing the same pension level by 25 to 30%. This remark is compounded when observing that if 65 is the statutory age of retirement in most countries, the effective age at which individuals cease working is lower: 59.9 in the EU-15. For men, this figure ranges from 57.8 in Belgium to 63.1 in the United Kingdom. In the absence of reforms such changes will put at risk the sustainability of European pay-as-you-go pension systems.

An obvious response to increased life-expectancy would be to raise the retirement age, both the statutory and the effective ones. Yet, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) stressed that the generosity of policymakers in the pension area is reflected by the fact that since 1970, the effective retirement age has declined in several industrial countries while life expectancy has increased significantly. Why are policymakers so generous and why have they been unable to maintain a reasonable balance between life expectancy and retirement age? First, increasing eligibility and real benefits in pay-as-you-go pension systems is not very costly in the short-term, since budgetary imbalances, as measured by general government deficit, will only unfold in the longer term. Second, there has been a strong support in the public at large for social protection, which certainly contributed to increasing government size. Increased life expectancy brings about a gain for those who will benefit from pensions paid over a longer period of time and are reluctant to accept cuts in what they perceive as entitlements.

The support for generous pension systems seems to be well established in Europe. All recent surveys indicate that the majority of Europeans, including the young ones, intend to retire between 56 and 60 and very few expect to be still on the labour market after age 65. It is thus not surprising that a number of governments, particularly in countries where the effective age of retirement is especially low, have been unable to raise the age of retirement. We have here a good example of a policy which is desirable from most viewpoints -- social welfare, majority choice -- and yet cannot be implemented. In this paper, we present a simple model explaining such a resistance to change or, to put it another way, such a bias towards status quo. Then we quantify the extent of the problem by calculating for a number of European countries and several years the length of expected retirement. Our objective is to find what are the determinants of an ever increasing length of retirement that is clearly unsustainable.

Our main result highlights the role of preferences in the resistance to reforms. Based on survey data, we identify different attitudes towards pensions in European countries, which can be divided into two groups: a group characterised by a bias towards status quo and a group more open to reforms. This group dummy is shown to explain part of the "inefficiency" in public pension spending, as identified from the estimation of a best practice frontier.

From a policy perspective, the main challenge therefore is to make voters aware of the consequences of the status quo strategy for the sustainability of pension systems. In this respect, long-term pension projections​[1]​ may increase awareness in the public at large and makes it easier to reach a consensus on the need for pension reforms.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple theoretical model showing that reforms that would ex post be beneficial for a majority may be voted down ex ante. Section 3 examines the length of retirement from both a cross-country and a time series perspective, pointing to a general increase in the length of retirement over the past four decades. Section 4 proposes a simple model of retirement, explaining the difference between the effective and the optimal age of retirement, as derived from the estimation of a best-practice frontier.


2. A simple theoretical model


























The optimal amount of saving  is given by the FOC:
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By this assumption, we mean that the first type of individuals, characterised by low productivity and poor health, would like to retire earlier and the two others later.



















where . One clearly see that when  is the only instrument, it is chosen considering two effects: (i) it is a compromise among the optimal ages  (ii); it benefits those with productivity below the mean.

In this paper we assume that  is not optimal or rather that it is not anymore optimal because of, e.g., aging. It would be desirable to increase it from  to .
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Quite clearly for low values of and above all of, this inequality holds.

For , there is a majority in favour of the policy reform . However if the reform is proposed before low productivity workers know about their health status, namely in the middle of the first period, they will vote for the reform only if their expected utility following the implementation of the reform exceeds their expected utility under a no-policy change scenario, i.e. only if

 		(2)
                    
where  and . Note that there is a majority for the reform if, from a utilitarian perspective, the expected gain of type 2 individuals exceeds the expected loss of type 1 individuals, allowing for Pareto-improving transfers ex post.

With , inequality (1) and a strong concavity of u(⋅), the reform could be rejected even though ex post it would be supported by a majority of citizens. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that this outcome is even possible with risk neutrality. The fact that the outcome depends on the concavity of the utility function suggests that observed cross-country differences in resistance to reforms could also be attributed to differences in preferences rather than to socio-economic factors, such as national income or health conditions.

We thus have a reform that would improve the welfare of a majority of workers and yet it is rejected ex ante by another majority of workers. To circumvent this typical ratchet effect, the government should guarantee the workers with poor health that they will not be subject to the reform. In other words they will keep the possibility of retiring at age .

Here we face the issues of commitment and credibility. Indeed, it is not clear that workers will trust their government's commitment to protect the disabled from the adverse consequences of the reform. As it is well known governments' credibility varies across countries and we can expect that social security reforms will be more successful where governments are credible. The conclusion one can draw from this simple model is that reforms are more likely in countries with more credible public authorities and less uncertainty as to the capacity to work long and healthy.

There exist other explanations of the difficulty of reforming social security and particularly of raising the age of retirement. First of all, there is a pure redistributive factor. If a majority of citizens benefit from the status quo, a reform will be difficult. Cremer and Pestieau (2003) have shown that workers don't realize that a true status quo is unrealistic and that if they vote against the reform they will not avoid a cut in pension benefits. If they were given the real alternative: unchanged retirement age and reduced benefits on the one hand and increased retirement age and unchanged benefits on the other hand, they would predominantly vote for the reform.

 3. The length of retirement








The effective age of retirement is a synthetic measure of the rate of activity of elderly workers which is known to have decreased everywhere over the last four decades, but to a variable extent across countries. As shown by Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) the main explanation for such a decline is the generosity of social security programs that induce elderly workers to exit the labour market much before the statutory age of retirement.







Figure 2 gives life expectancy at birth for both sexes together. In 1960, it ranged from 73.5 in the Netherlands to 64.0 in Portugal. In 2000, it went from 79.6 in Sweden to 76.5 in Ireland. These numbers point to both significant increases in and convergence of life expectancy in Europe (EU-15).






 This rapid increase in the length of retirement is due to two contrasting evolutions: an increase in longevity that is explained by both medical progress and living habits and a decline in the activity rate of elderly workers that is explained by social security but also by economic growth. Our purpose is not really to explain these evolutions but rather to explain why some countries seem to have behaviour towards retirement that is less reactive than others to factors that should lead them to increase their age of retirement.







4. Model of retirement

Microeconomics theory shows that a rational worker would choose an age of retirement that decreases with income and wealth (leisure being a normal good) and that increases with longevity (additional earnings are needed). This rational choice can be distorted by public policy notably in case of unemployment. Unemployment normally leads elderly worker to withdraw from the labour force; if furthermore the government thinks that exiting elderly workers from the labour market may help youth employment, it will create inducements to early retirement. On this basis, we start with a simple relation:


which relates the effective age of retirement, r, to income y (negatively) and to both longevity, ℓ, and one minus the unemployment rate, (1-u) (positively). We will use this relation to construct a best practice frontier. Each country taken in three periods, 1970-1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-2000, will be evaluated with respect to this frontier and the slack between its behaviour and the frontier will be considered as measuring its resistance to reforms. It is important to understand that by including the unemployment rate in the function we are not saying that this is a good policy. In fact, we believe that lowering the age of retirement has no effect on unemployment. What matters here is to represent the behaviour of governments. As a consequence, the slack that we are measuring are taken relative to a behaviour that is already inefficient.

















We have modified this simple relation in several ways. The explanatory variables are lagged and we have also used their variations, over the previous period, as regressors. All these variables are expressed in logarithms, as well as the endogenous variable. Moreover, we also included periods and clusters dummy variables as potential explanatory factors of slacks to the frontier.




where , and  (i = 1,...,6) and (j = 1,2,3) the parameters to be estimated.

The  and  indicate binary variables for periods 1980-1990 and 1990-2000, respectively, and  a dummy for cluster A. Moreover,  is a stochastic random term assumed to have the usual iid properties and a normal distribution, , and   an iid non-negative random variable associated with slacks to the frontier assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution .

Batesse and Coelli (1995) developed the log-likelihood function of this model and the corresponding derivatives.​[3]​ Note that besides  and , two other parameters are estimated, simultaneously:  and . Slacks to the frontier are estimated as expectations .








In the second panel of Table 3 we find the explanatory factors of inefficiency (the gap between the best practice frontier and actual behaviour). As expected, countries belonging to Cluster A are closer to the best practice frontier. Higher inefficiencies are observed over time, particularly for the period 1980-1990, but the estimated coefficients are not significant at all.​[4]​ Very little change is observed over the period 1970-2000, reflecting significant inertia of attitudes towards pensions.
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Effective age of retirement
Men and women together: 1960 and 2000













Life expectancy at birth
Men and women together: 1960 and 2000





Expected length of retirement




























Q.48	Intended age of retirement
Q.55	% of people who anticipate after retirement they will be able to enjoy without having to worry about money or they will be able to live reasonably well
Q.66	% of people who think that in the future the aging process will pose a major problem
Q.673	% of people who agree that the age of retirement should be raised
Q.681	% of people who agree that people in their late 50's should give up work to make way for younger and unemployed people




Table 3: Retirement frontier model
Periods: 70-80, 80-90 and 90-00 – 15 countries

Variable	Coefficient	Standard error	t-test
















Data sources: GDP/capita (OECD, 2004b), unemployment (OECD, 2001), longevity (OECD, 2004a).




Effective and optimal age of retirement by cluster and country




























































^1	  The reports published by the Economic Policy Committee provide benchmarks for assessing challenges posed by population ageing in Europe (EU-15). See Rother, Catenaro and Schwab (2004) for a study on ageing and pensions in the euro area.
^2	  This model was initially presented in Fenge and Pestieau (2005). See also Cremer et al. (2004) for an approach with a non-linear scheme.
^3	  We use the FRONTIER program developed by Coelli (1996) to estimate the model.
^4	  As observed at the bottom of Table 3, the parameter is equal to one, which indicates that the estimated model is deterministic. In other words, the composed error term, Vt -μt , is fully attributed to efficiency slacks.
